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Materiality is a fundamental auditing concept. The 
determination and application of materiality in the 
conduct of an external audit is regulated by International 
Standards on Auditing. This paper analysed the benefits 
and drawbacks of materiality disclosures in Maltese 
statutory auditing from the perspective of Maltese 
auditors, whilst measuring and explaining their resistance 
to such disclosures. 
A mixed-methods research design was adopted whereby 
data was collected from Maltese auditors first using a self-
administered questionnaire, followed by semi-structured 
interviews. 
This paper concluded that the drawbacks of disclosing 
materiality in Maltese statutory audit reports greatly 
outweighed any potential benefits that might be reaped. 
Maltese auditors generally resisted disclosing materiality 
levels mainly due to the drawbacks associated with such 
disclosures. This paper also concluded that materiality 
disclosures in the audit report should, at present, be 
avoided in Malta because the local market is not 
sufficiently mature and knowledgeable to properly 











The Maltese statutory auditing framework encompasses all Maltese registered companies 
because Article 19(4)(a) of the Income Tax Management Act (2014, Chap.372) continues 
to impose the obligation of conducting a full scope statutory audit on all companies 
registered in Malta, irrespective of their size or ownership structure. An external audit of 
financial statements provides reasonable assurance as to whether the audited financial 
statements as a whole are prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with an 
identifiable financial reporting framework. Thus, the auditor is only responsible to detect 
misstatements that are material to the financial statements as a whole (ISA 200, IAASB, 
2009a). 
Materiality is defined indirectly in ISA 320 ‘Materiality in Planning and Performing an 
Audit’ (IAASB, 2009c) as follows: 
“Misstatements, including omissions, are considered to be material if they, 
individually or in the aggregate, could reasonably be expected to influence the 
economic decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements.” – 
Para. 2 
Although at first glance this definition appears to be a relatively simple one, applying it in 
practice is often fraught with subjectivity and complexity. The auditor has to distinguish 
between omissions and misstatements that would affect the users of financial statements 
and those that would not affect such users (Vorhies, 2005). In addition, the fact that 
general purpose financial statements are prepared for a range of primary users 
comprising “existing and potential investors, lenders and other creditors” (IFRS 
Foundation, 2010) adds to the complexity of such assessment since materiality is likely to 
be unique to each user (Doxey, 2013). However, ISA 320 (IAASB, 2009c, para.10) 
simplifies the situation by stipulating that when determining materiality, the auditor 
considers the “common financial information needs of users as a group” and thus ignores 
the needs of “specific individual users”. 
Materiality Disclosures in Statutory Auditing:  A Maltese Perspective 
Materiality in the context of an audit takes the form of a numeric threshold which the 
auditor initially determines by applying a certain percentage to a chosen benchmark (ISA 
320, IAASB, 2009c, para.A3; Porter et al., 2003). Materiality is inherently subjective and 
susceptible to misinterpretation because its seemingly clear-cut numerical form must be 
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interpreted in light of surrounding qualitative circumstances by applying professional 
judgement (Azzopardi and Baldacchino, 2009; ISA 320, IAASB, 2009c, para.A3). In 
addition, materiality affects the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures and it is a 
significant determinant of audit effort and cost (Joldoş et al., 2010). Thus, materiality has 
to be considered throughout the entire audit process (ISA 320, IAASB, 2009c). 
The question as to whether materiality is relevant for users of financial statements was 
raised as early as 1977 (Fisher, 1990; Leslie, 1977 cited in Davis, 2005); however, there 
is still no requirement in ISAs to disclose materiality information in the auditor’s report 
(IAASB, 2014), although such information may be communicated to those charged with 
governance (ISA 260, IAASB, 2009b, para.A13). 
Materiality disclosures are presently not mandatory in Maltese statutory auditing. 
Moreover, according to a study by Azzopardi and Baldacchino (2009), Maltese audit 
practitioners were in 2009 largely against the idea of disclosing materiality information 
in the audit report due to the perceived risks of doing so. 
Several foreign studies have shown that materiality disclosures in the audit report could 
have beneficial effects, while other studies have raised concerns of potential drawbacks. 
Research from a users’ perspective seems to conclude that materiality should be 
disclosed, whilst research from the auditors’ perspective is still in its primitive stages, 
although it seems that auditors are rather apprehensive about disclosing materiality. In 
fact, Doxey (2013) and the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Institute (2013) observed 
that users of the audit report seem to be in favour of materiality disclosures, whilst the 
auditors seem to be against such disclosures. This lack of consensus with regards to 
materiality disclosures is part of a much larger audit reporting debate which has been 
going on for many decades. 
Key Definitions 
The following terms used in this study shall be defined as follows: 
Materiality disclosures are the act of presenting materiality thresholds and 
accompanying qualitative information. 
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Non-audit accountants are accountants registered with the Malta Accountancy 
Board (MAB) who had never worked as external auditors at the time they 
responded to the questionnaire used in this study. 
Past auditors are members registered with the MAB who had stopped practicing 
as auditors prior to the time they responded to the questionnaire. 
Present auditors are auditors registered with the MAB who were practicing as 
auditors at the time they responded to the questionnaire. 
Respondents refer collectively to present and past auditors who responded to the 
questionnaire. 
The Regulation refers to Article 11(2)(h) of EU Regulation No. 537/2014, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
Users refers to the readers of audited financial statements and especially to the 
users of general purpose financial reporting, being “existing and potential investors, 
lenders and other creditors” as defined by the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) Foundation’s Conceptual Framework (2010, p.9). 
Literature Review 
Materiality is one of the fundamental auditing concepts throughout the entire audit 
process, from the initial planning stage, the collection of audit evidence and eventually, 
the issuance of the audit opinion. At the planning stage, the auditor is required to set a 
numeric materiality threshold for the financial statements as a whole (ISA 320, IAASB, 
2009c), commonly referred to as “overall or planning materiality” (Eilifsen and Messier Jr, 
2014, p.5). In addition, when conducting audit testing, the auditor is also required to set 
a “performance materiality” threshold below overall materiality to reduce to an 
appropriately low level the probability that the aggregate of undetected and uncorrected 
errors exceeds overall materiality (Millichamp and Taylor, 2012, pp.134-135). The latter 
is also known as “tolerable error” (Porter et al., 2003, p.338) or “tolerable misstatement” 
(Eilifsen and Messier Jr, 2014, p.5) and is the magnitude of detected errors that the auditor 
will tolerate without requiring management to make corrections, or otherwise consider 
the implications on the audit opinion according to ISA 705 ‘Modification to the Opinion in 
the Independent Auditor’s Report’ (IAASB, 2009e). Moreover, the auditor may set as many 
materiality levels as deemed necessary, including materiality for different classes of 
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transactions, account balances and disclosures. Such thresholds may be set at any level 
below overall materiality (ISA 320, IAASB, 2009c, para.10; Porter et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, ISA 450 ‘Evaluation of Misstatements Identified during the Audit’ (IAASB, 
2009d, para.15) requires the auditor to determine and document a Clearly Trivial 
Threshold (CTT). Therefore, in summary, as a minimum, the auditor establishes the 
following quantitative materiality thresholds: overall materiality, performance 
materiality and CTT. In addition to these three thresholds, the auditor determines more 
thresholds when conducting a group audit and when reporting to an Audit Committee 
(AC) of the client entity (FRC, 2015b). 
There are no prescribed methods or mathematical formulae to calculate such thresholds, 
although guidelines exist. As a starting point for determining the overall materiality 
threshold, auditors typically multiply a selected benchmark by a percentage. Auditors 
may also use blended methods by multiplying several benchmarks with corresponding 
percentages and then taking their average (Wiley, 2015). Furthermore, sliding scale 
methods may also be used. These methods consist of percentages which vary in steps 
depending on the size of the selected benchmark or the entity (Wiley, 2015). The 
performance materiality threshold and the CTT are then calculated as a percentage of 
overall materiality (Azzopardi and Baldacchino, 2009; Eilifsen and Messier Jr, 2014; 
Porter et al., 2003). Although materiality thresholds may be revised in the course of an 
audit, this paper focuses on the disclosure of the final amounts for such thresholds. 
Items that exceed materiality thresholds are material by virtue of their size. However, 
items falling below such thresholds and purely qualitative disclosures in the financial 
statements can be material by virtue of their nature and/or impact on the users 
(Millichamp and Taylor, 2012; Wiley, 2015). For example, items that change a loss into a 
profit, conceal a management fraud or violate laws and regulations governing the auditee 
are material regardless of their size (Millichamp and Taylor, 2012; Turner, 2003). 
A detailed review of existing literature identified the following benefits and drawbacks of 
disclosing materiality in the audit report: 
Benefits of Materiality Disclosures 
(i) Improved market efficiency: Fisher (1990) found that trades in a simplified 
experimental market setting are more correctly priced when audit materiality levels are 
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disclosed because users can better assess the relative quality of the financial statements. 
This holds for both public and private disclosure of materiality, with the former appearing 
to be more effective than the latter. 
(ii) More accurate perceptions of the audit report by investors: Non-disclosure of 
materiality often leads to the misconception that a clean audit report guarantees that the 
financial statements are correct (Houghton, 2010). In this context, Davis (2005) found 
that materiality disclosures help investors perceive the audit report more accurately by 
being less overconfident. 
(iii) Alignment of auditors’ materiality judgements with those of users: Since materiality is 
defined from the users’ perspective, auditors’ materiality judgements should, at least in 
theory, be identical to (or aligned with) those of the users (Højskov, 1998). However some 
discrepancy exists and it is undesirable since it allows for the existence of errors deemed 
immaterial by auditors that can affect users’ decisions on the basis of the financial 
statements (Doxey, 2013). Positively, Turner (2003), Højskov (1998) and Leslie (1985 
cited in Davis, 2005) assert that alignment may be possible via materiality disclosures. 
(iv) A reduction of the Audit Expectations Gap (AEG): One of the persistent issues in audit 
reporting has always been the AEG to which the lack of understanding of the concept of 
materiality and its non-disclosure is a significant contributing factor (De Martinis and 
Burrowes, 1996; Houghton, 2010). Shaikh and Talha (2003), Højskov (1998) and De 
Martinis and Burrowes (1996) sustain that this AEG may be reduced via disclosure of 
materiality information, by helping readers of the audit report understand what the 
auditor actually does. In addition, the weak understanding of materiality is a major culprit 
of the AEG (Houghton, 2010). Disclosing materiality could thus narrow the AEG by 
improving users’ understanding of materiality and could possibly reduce auditor 
litigation costs (Doxey, 2013). 
(v) Enhancement of the communicative value of the auditor’s report: According to Doxey 
(2013), disclosing more information in the auditor’s report, such as materiality levels, 
adds to the report’s value and transparency. Disclosure of quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of materiality would make the audit report more understandable, improve 
auditor-user communication, and enable users to assess the precision and level of 
assurance of the audit (Church et al., 2008; De Martinis and Burrowes, 1996; Doxey, 2013; 
Manson and Zaman, 2001). Such advantages would lead to the users making better 
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decisions, whilst remaining vigilant of the possibility that audited financial statements 
still contain undetected errors (De Martinis and Burrowes, 1996). 
(vi) The provision of more relevant information to credit institutions: A German study by 
Ruhnke et al. (2014) documented statistically significant evidence that as overall 
materiality thresholds are increased, the probability of granting credit decreases and the 
credit risk premium and credit collateral demanded by the lenders increase. Thus, 
materiality information is also relevant for credit institutions. This agrees with Litjens et 
al. (2015) who state that all information in the audit report is considered important by 
bankers. 
Drawbacks of Materiality Disclosures 
(i) Revealing the extent of ‘safe’ financial statement manipulation: Houghton et al. (2011) 
argue that materiality disclosures provide management with useful information as to the 
extent of financial statement manipulation they can engage in such that if detected, the 
auditor would still consider the misstatement as immaterial. 
(ii) Risk that users misunderstand materiality disclosures: The average investor will find it 
difficult to comprehend materiality disclosures, especially if multiple thresholds are 
disclosed (Vanstraelen et al., 2012). The need for more education on materiality identified 
by Houghton et al. (2011) aggravates the risk that if materiality disclosures are not 
preceded by proper education, they would be misunderstood. This could create confusion 
(Litjens et al., 2015) and/or widen the AEG (Houghton, 2010) along with other potentially 
negative consequences. For instance, the ensuing controversy on materiality reduces the 
credibility of the audit (Azzopardi and Baldacchino, 2009). This is a real possibility when 
considering that users comprise a heterogeneous group, for which it is highly unlikely that 
every user would be satisfied with the auditor’s materiality judgements (CFA Institute, 
2013). Positively, exposing such disagreement in the public domain may be an effective 
way of resolving it (Shaikh and Talha, 2003). 
(iii) Higher audit costs, litigation costs and time-pressure on the auditor: Any expansion of 
the audit report such as the addition of materiality disclosures increases audit costs and 
puts more pressure on the auditor (Vanstraelen et al., 2012). Adding materiality 
disclosures to the audit report would inevitably lengthen it. This is a cause for concern, 
especially since the growth of disclosure may create an information overload which is 
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undesirable to the users (Vanstraelen et al., 2012). Any disclosures added to the audit 
report could also become boilerplate language (Church et al., 2008) which regulators and 
investors seek to avoid (PCAOB, 2011). In addition, rather than limiting the auditors’ 
liability, litigation against auditors may be increased if errors deemed immaterial by the 
auditor are subsequently proven to be material (Højskov, 1998; Jennings et al., 1996; 
Vanstraelen et al., 2012). For instance, misstatements below materiality levels may cause 
material distortions in certain financial ratios (Turner, 1997) which may affect users’ 
decisions. Moreover, the auditor can easily be held liable for misstatements above 
materiality thresholds disclosed (PCAOB, 2011). Another risk is that the lack of 
prescriptive rules or standards on audit materiality and its associated subjectivity 
exposes the auditor to litigation for applying the concept of materiality inappropriately 
(Litjens et al., 2015). 
(iv) Anchoring: Doxey (2013) claims that explicit disclosure of auditor materiality 
thresholds pulls users’ materiality judgements towards those of the auditor (anchoring). 
This implies that if users’ materiality levels are below those used by the auditor, anchoring 
would cause such levels to be pulled upwards. Therefore, users would end up taking more 
risk than they otherwise would in the absence of materiality disclosures. 
(v) Impairment of professional judgement: The risk is that management would put forth 
certain arguments in an attempt to influence the auditor’s materiality judgements, and 
thus impinge on his independence (Houghton et al., 2011). For instance, management 
could attempt to convince the auditor that certain misstatements or aggressive 
accounting practices are immaterial. Such disagreement between management and the 
auditor poses a client retention risk for the auditor (Litjens et al., 2015) which can impair 
auditor independence. 
(vi) Detrimental to firms with low profitability seeking credit: Materiality, along with other 
disclosures in the audit report may contribute towards a “self-fulfilling prophecy” 
(Vanstraelen et al., 2012, p.203) whereby revealing the risks that the entity is exposed to 
hinders its ability to generate external funds. Ruhnke et al. (2014) confirm that disclosure 
of liberal materiality thresholds makes it more difficult for firms with low profitability to 
obtain credit from banks. This situation is both a drawback from the auditee’s viewpoint, 
and an advantage for bankers since it enables them to avoid risky clients. 




Existing literature identifies several reasons why auditors may resist materiality 
disclosures, other than the aforementioned drawbacks. Firstly, auditors sometimes waive 
misstatements above materiality thresholds. Such practice would no longer be possible if 
the thresholds are disclosed. Thus, for this reason, auditors may resist materiality 
disclosures (Wright and Wright, 1997 cited in Doxey, 2013). Secondly, auditors may 
consider materiality information as sensitive or proprietary (Manson and Zaman, 2001; 
Waters and Tiller, 1997 cited in Davis, 2005). This barrier has to be overcome if 
materiality is to be disclosed. Thirdly, if the larger audit firms use higher materiality 
thresholds than their smaller counterparts (Messier et al., 2005), they might be reluctant 
to disclose such thresholds in order to avoid giving the impression of a weaker audit and 
possibly damage their reputation. Fourthly, auditors may fear that disclosing materiality 
thresholds gives the impression that materiality is not a matter of professional judgement 
and could mislead users (Manson and Zaman, 2001). 
Furthermore, the fact that auditors find it difficult to anticipate users’ reactions to 
materiality disclosures (Fisher, 1990) could be a reason for their hesitation to disclose 
materiality. To this effect, Fisher (1990) maintains that auditors may prefer disclosing 
materiality thresholds to management and others having good knowledge of the entity 
rather than publicly. 
Moreover, the auditee may expect the auditor to use lower materiality levels if they are to 
be disclosed. This causes management to oppose materiality disclosures in fear of higher 
audit fees (Litjens et al., 2015). The auditee may also resist materiality disclosures 
because such information is useful for those seeking to commit fraud against the auditee. 
Thus the auditor might be reluctant to disclose materiality because the client does not 
want him to do so. 
Materiality Disclosures in Practice 
There are currently relatively few practical examples of materiality disclosures. These are 
discussed below. 
PIEs in the UK and Ireland: As a result of ISA 700 ‘The independent auditor’s report on 
financial statements (UK and Ireland)’ (FRC, 2014) auditors of PIEs in the UK and Ireland 
which follow the UK Corporate Governance Code have started including materiality 
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disclosures in their audit reports. Such disclosures also utilised diagrams and graphs to 
improve presentation and readability (FRC, 2015b). Despite encouraging feedback, the 
UK Financial Reporting Council (FRC) notes that improvements could be made by 
explaining materiality in greater detail and including which benchmarks and percentages 
were used (FRC, 2015a). Interestingly, awards were given to the most insightful and 
innovative audit reports by the UK Investment Management Association (IMA) in 2014 
and 2015 (IMA, 2014; FRC, 2016). Moreover, auditors of PIEs in the Netherlands have to 
state the materiality threshold applied, explain its determination and that both 
quantitative and qualitative aspects were considered (NBA, 2014a; NBA, 2014b). In the 
US, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) has not yet mandated any 
materiality disclosures, but is closely monitoring their effects in the UK and Ireland 
(Bagshaw, 2015). 
EU Regulation No. 537/2014: This EU Regulation (The European Parliament and the 
Council of the European Union, 2014) mandates that as from 17th June 2016, auditors are 
to submit an additional report to the AC of PIEs which apart from other information, has 
to: 
“disclose the quantitative level of materiality applied to perform the statutory 
audit for the financial statements as a whole and where applicable the 
materiality level or levels for particular classes of transactions, account 
balances or disclosures, and disclose the qualitative factors which were 
considered when setting the level of materiality;” – Article 11(2)(h) 
Methods of Disclosing Materiality 
Literature on how materiality should be disclosed is quite limited. According to Fisher 
(1990) both public and private disclosures improve market efficiency, although public 
disclosures appeared more effective. This agrees with the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board’s (FASB) recommendation “that auditor materiality thresholds be publicly reported” 
(Davis, 2005, p.4). However, these indications are by no means conclusive. 
Another issue that is not studied exhaustively in the literature pertains to the extent of 
rules needed to regulate materiality disclosures. Limited evidence from the UK 
demonstrates that materiality disclosures mandated by purposefully vague, principle-
based rules were successful, as auditors sought to innovate and improve the materiality 
disclosures in their report (FRC, 2015b). Additionally, mandatory materiality disclosures 
may deter auditors from falsifying their materiality disclosures (Davis, 2005). 
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With respect to the presentation of materiality disclosures, several researchers have 
suggested supplementing paragraphs with web links, tables, diagrams, charts and 
footnotes (Church et al., 2008; FRC, 2015b; Houghton, 2010; Turner et al., 2010; 
Vanstraelen et al., 2012). 
The Maltese Scenario 
The only Maltese study available on materiality disclosures claims that “the proposal of 
disclosing materiality thresholds to reduce the omnipresent expectations gap was strongly 
rejected” amongst Maltese auditors (Azzopardi and Baldacchino, 2009, p.13). Several 
reasons were found justifying Maltese auditors’ apprehension with disclosing materiality. 
In particular, auditors believed that such disclosures would not be comprehended and 
might be perceived as giving absolute assurance up to the materiality level stated. 
Nevertheless, the study by Azzopardi and Baldacchino (2009) also found that materiality 
disclosures may be beneficial if adequately regulated and properly understood by users. 
Objectives 
The purpose of this study is to achieve the following objectives: 
Objective 1: to determine the benefits and drawbacks of disclosing the quantitative 
and qualitative dimensions of audit materiality in Maltese statutory audit reports, 
from the perspective of Maltese auditors. 
Objective 2: to measure and explain the resistance towards, and frequency of 
materiality disclosures in Maltese statutory auditing. 
Objective 3: to identify the preferences of Maltese auditors, on the location, method, 
content and regulation of materiality disclosures in the case of listed entities and 
non-listed entities. 
Objective 4: to determine whether opinions on materiality disclosures differ 
significantly between Maltese present auditors and past auditors; and between 
auditors and non-audit accountants. 




A mixed-methods research design consisting of a quantitative phase followed by a 
qualitative phase was adopted. This pragmatic methodology enabled the study to benefit 
from the strengths of both approaches. 
Population and Sampling 
The population consists of all 2,311 registered auditors and accountants listed on the 
Registered Accountants Register on the website of the Malta Accountancy Board (MAB) 
(2015a) as at 20th October 2015. This population was divided into 1,225 registered 
auditors as per the Registered Auditors Register on the website of the MAB (2015b) as at 
20th October 2015, and the remainder of 1,086 non-audit accountants. This study focuses 
on the main population of 1,225 registered auditors. The whole population was included 
in the sample. 
The population was targeted directly via email, indirectly through audit firms in Malta and 
by distributing printed copies of the questionnaire at an MIA Continuing Professional 
Education (CPE) event (MIA, 2015a). 
Research Instruments and Participants 
The study employed a self-administered questionnaire for the collection of quantitative 
data from Maltese auditors and non-audit accountants (vide Appendix 1). Quantitative 
data was collected between 20th October and 19th November 2015 and was subsequently 
analysed in order to develop an interview schedule for obtaining qualitative data from 
Maltese audit partners. 
The questionnaire utilised a five-point Likert rating scale together with a few category 
questions and open questions. Section A of the questionnaire measured the auditors’ 
opinion on the benefits and drawbacks of disclosing materiality in the audit report using 
a list of statements derived from the literature review, followed by Section B which 
measured the auditors’ resistance towards materiality disclosures. Section C evaluated 
the auditors’ opinion on disclosing materiality in several reports (location), using 
different methods (method), disclosing different aspects of materiality (content) and 
whether materiality should be mandatory or voluntary (regulation). Finally, Section D 
elicited some other information which the researcher deemed relevant on the basis of 
existing literature. Section E concluded the questionnaire by collecting demographic data 
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for statistical analysis. A pilot study of the questionnaire was also conducted and 
suggestions for improvement were noted. 
A total of 241 valid responses were collected, of which 191 were complete responses.  The 
majority of respondents were males (62.1%) and were fairly divided between big-four 
firms and other firms, and between all age groups. Approximately half of the respondents 
(50.8%) occupied the position of senior, manager or assistant manager. Furthermore, the 
majority of respondents (67.6%) had less than ten years of audit experience and 34.3% 
had three years of audit experience or less. 
The interview schedule was developed from an analysis of the 241 valid responses that 
were collected till 19th November 2015. The interview questions were carefully worded 
to explore further the key findings that emerged from the analysis of quantitative data. 
The interview schedule consisted of four Sections with headers identical to those of the 
questionnaire. The most significant finding from each question in the questionnaire was 
stated, followed by one or two questions on the matter. Five partners from big-four audit 
firms, five partners from other audit firms and one technical manager at the MIA were 
selected, for a total of eleven semi-structured interviews. 
Data Analysis Procedures 
The quantitative data obtained from the questionnaires was analysed using IBM SPSS 
Statistics Version 23. Initially, frequencies and other descriptive statistics were generated 
as a first step in understanding the data. Secondly, the Friedman test was used to compare 
mean rating scores provided for a number of related statements and identify the 
statistically significant outcomes to be followed up via interviews. 
Subsequently, the internal consistency, normality and linearity of the data were tested. 
The one sample t-test and binomial test were also conducted to determine whether the 
mean rating scores differed significantly from neutral. The research hypotheses were then 
tested using the post hoc pairwise comparison test and the Pearson correlation test.  
Appendix 2 includes a definition of the variables used in the study. 
Responses from auditors were segregated into present auditors and past auditors; and 
responses from non-audit accountants were compared with auditor responses using 
appropriate statistical tests, in order to make full use of the data collected. A parsimonious 
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univariate general linear regression model was then generated in order to explain 
quantitatively the resistance of Maltese auditors towards materiality disclosures. 
The interview transcriptions were grouped by each question in the interview schedule. 
This enabled a key theme to be identified for every question. Themes relating to the topic 
as a whole were also identified.




This Section presents the quantitative and qualitative findings of the study. The findings 
are grouped according to the four objectives of the study that have been stated earlier on. 
Objective 1: Benefits and Drawbacks of Materiality Disclosures in Audit Reports 
The benefit that materiality disclosures align the auditor’s judgement of what is material 
with what really affects users of financial statements obtained the highest mean rating 
score (x̄=3.73) of all eight benefits that were presented in the questionnaire. In contrast, 
interviewees generally disagreed (8/11) with this alignment benefit. Such disagreement 
stemmed from the drawbacks of disclosing materiality, which according to interviewees 
greatly outweigh its potential benefits. 
With respect to the drawbacks, respondents assigned the highest mean rating score (x̄=3.59) 
to the statement that users will interpret materiality thresholds as absolute assurance up 
to the level stated. Such drawback was the most prominent of all sixteen drawbacks that 
were presented to respondents. In addition, interviewees emphasised that the drawbacks 
of materiality disclosures greatly outweigh its benefits, as shown in Figure 1 (below). 
 
Figure 1: Benefits and drawbacks of materiality disclosures 
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Objective 2: Auditor Materiality Disclosure Resistance and Frequency 
When presented with a list of seven statements intended to gauge their resistance to 
disclosing materiality, auditors assigned the highest score to the statement that it is 
difficult to anticipate users’ reactions to materiality disclosures (x̄=3.52). It was also found 
that auditors generally do not disclose materiality to their audit clients (x̄=2.36). 
All interviewees (11/11) firmly agreed with this finding and expressed strong resistance 
towards materiality disclosures due to the drawbacks outlined above. Similarly, five audit 
firms had a policy of never disclosing materiality whilst in another five firms it was normal 
practice to avoid such disclosures and to only consider cautious disclosure if the client 
specifically requests such information. Two of the big-four firms never disclosed 
materiality thresholds, whilst the other two firms did in rare and exceptional 
circumstances. 
Objective 3: Location, Method, Content and Regulation of Materiality Disclosures 
Respondents assigned the highest mean rating score to disclosing materiality in an 
additional report to the AC at the end of the audit for listed entities (x̄=3.33). 
Correspondingly, for non-listed entities they assigned the highest score to disclosing 
materiality in the audit report (x̄=3.08). Such a score is very close to neutrality (x̄=3) and in fact 
interviewees believed there was no scope for materiality disclosures for non-listed 
entities. 
With respect to the method for disclosing materiality, respondents agreed mostly with 
paragraphs (Listed x̄=3.20; Nonlisted x̄=3.09) and disagreed mostly with a link to a website (Listed x̄=1.88; 
Nonlisted x̄=1.84). Interviewees considered the use of paragraphs (10/11) as the most appropriate 
and flexible method to disclose materiality, whilst Materiality Per Share (MPS) proposed 
by Turner (2003) and a link to a website were strongly rejected (MPS: 11/11; Web: 10/11). 
Respondents were also presented with ten statements on what materiality disclosures 
could contain, for listed and non-listed entities respectively. For both types of entities, 
respondents gave the highest score to the materiality threshold for the financial 
statements as a whole (Listed x̄=3.61; Nonlisted x̄=3.46). Interviewees (11/11) suggested that in addition 
to overall materiality, the following should also be disclosed: materiality levels for classes 
of transactions, account balances or disclosures (1/11), performance materiality (1/11), 
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significant qualitative considerations (2/11), the benchmark used together with the reasons 
for selection (4/11) and the percentage applied to the selected benchmark (1/11). 
Moreover, respondents and interviewees (9/11) preferred making materiality disclosures 
mandatory for listed entities (x̄=3.19) rather than for non-listed entities (x̄=2.48). Respondents 
and interviewees also agreed that users should be well educated before introducing 
materiality disclosures	(x̄=3.89,	10/11), and that materiality disclosures must be well regulated 
(x̄=3.84,	9/11). Interviewees’ opinions were fairly equally distributed between principle-based	
(3/11), rules-based	(4/11) or a mixed style	(3/11)	of rules. 
Furthermore, respondents and interviewees	strongly disagreed with giving awards or 
formal acknowledgement to Maltese audit firms with the best materiality disclosures 
(x̄=2.19,	11/11). Most of the audit partners in big-four firms knew that materiality disclosures 
in the audit report are mandatory for PIEs in the UK and Ireland and were also aware of 
Article 11(2)(h) of EU Regulation No. 537/2014. 
Objective	4:	Present	Auditors,	Past	Auditors	and	Non-Audit	Accountants	
The 241 responses from auditors comprise 133 present and 108 past auditors. Past 
auditors rated AMD (“Audit Materiality Disclosures”) Benefits, AMD Location Listed and 
Nonlisted, AMD Method Listed and Nonlisted, AMD Content Nonlisted and AMD 
Mandatory significantly higher than present auditors. Conversely, past auditors scored 
AMD Drawbacks and AMD Resistance lower than present auditors. 
Non-audit accountants scored AMD Benefits, AMD Mandatory and AMD Awards 
significantly higher than auditors, whilst they scored AMD Drawbacks lower than 
auditors. Moreover, non-audit accountants were more in favour of mandatory materiality 
disclosures for listed entities than auditors.  




The results of hypotheses testing are presented in Table 1. 
Alternative Hypothesis Outcome 
H1: There is a negative correlation between AMD Benefits 
and AMD Resistance. 
Accepted 
H2: There is a positive correlation between AMD 
Drawbacks and AMD Resistance. 
Accepted 
H3: There is a negative correlation between AMD 
Frequency and AMD Resistance. 
Rejected 
H4: AMD Frequency Listed is significantly greater than 
AMD Frequency Nonlisted. 
Rejected 
H5: AMD Location Listed is significantly greater than AMD 
Location Nonlisted. 
Accepted 
H6: AMD Method Listed is significantly greater than AMD 
Method Nonlisted. 
Rejected 
H7: AMD Content Listed is significantly greater than AMD 
Content Nonlisted. 
Rejected 
H8: AMD Mandatory Listed is significantly greater than 
AMD Mandatory Nonlisted. 
Accepted 
Table 1: Results of hypotheses testing 
Linear Regression Model 
A parsimonious univariate General Linear Model (GLM) was generated in order to explain 
quantitatively the resistance of Maltese auditors towards materiality disclosures, thereby 
achieving Objective 2 more comprehensively. The dependent variable is AMD Resistance. 
All generated scores range from 1 to 5, where 1 corresponds to ‘no extent’ and 5 
corresponds to ‘high extent’. The parsimonious model was identified by using a backward 
procedure. Equation 1 defines the model mathematically. This four-predictor model 
explains 44.2% of the total variance of AMD Resistance. 
 	

= 1.648 − 0.142	 + 0.7


+ 0.131	ℎ !"	! − 0.164# 		$ %	! 
Equation 1: Final GLM 
Discussion on Findings 
The discussion presented in this Section is structured according to the four objectives of 
the study. 
Objective 1: Benefits and Drawbacks of Materiality Disclosures in Audit Reports 
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The drawbacks of disclosing materiality in Maltese statutory audit reports greatly 
outweighed any potential benefits that might be reaped. Drawbacks revolved around 
confusion, misinterpretation, the illusion of absolute assurance up to the thresholds 
disclosed, criticism against the auditors, impairment of professional judgement, 
manipulation below materiality thresholds, and more audit work. Benefits included 
alignment of the auditor’s judgement of what is material with what really affects users of 
financial statements, a possible reduction of the AEG and facilitation of discussions of 
audit adjustments with clients. However, users would only reap such benefits if they 
properly understood the materiality disclosures. Otherwise, the drawbacks mentioned 
above would most likely occur and possibly widen the AEG further. 
Furthermore, users of financial statements might use the auditor’s materiality thresholds 
as a guide for deciding whether an amount is relevant for taking a decision. Thus, the 
anchoring drawback stipulated by Doxey (2013) was also supported by Maltese auditors. 
Such behaviour would be problematic since materiality is primarily an audit tool which 
does not cater for specific requirements of different users. Moreover, in a dynamic 
environment, thresholds could become obsolete by the time users consider them for 
decision making and the users comprise a heterogeneous group for which it is highly 
unlikely that every user would be satisfied with the auditor’s materiality judgements. This 
amplifies the risk of reduced auditor credibility and might also cause users to pose 
conflicting demands on the auditors. 
Objective 2: Auditor Materiality Disclosure Resistance and Frequency 
The second objective of the study was to measure and explain the resistance of Maltese 
auditors towards materiality disclosures; and their frequency of disclosing it to their 
clients. AMD Resistance was measured using a five-point Likert scale and explained by the 
GLM. As expected, a strong link between the aforementioned drawbacks and AMD 
Resistance emerged. 
In addition, auditors preferred to restrict materiality disclosures to the more 
knowledgeable persons making up the ACs of listed entities. This was probably due to 
their fear that materiality disclosures would be misunderstood causing unanticipated 
user reactions. This argument supports similar assertions by Fisher (1990). 
Furthermore, auditors may have opposed such disclosures because materiality 
information is considered sensitive or proprietary and to avoid possibly giving an 
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impression that materiality is merely a mechanical calculation rather than a matter of 
professional judgement (Manson and Zaman, 2001; Waters and Tiller, 1997 cited in Davis, 
2005). Moreover, it seems that some audit clients did not want the auditor to disclose 
materiality levels in the audit report, whilst other clients had no such reservation. Thus, 
auditors expressed mixed views of auditee resistance to materiality disclosures. 
Interestingly, auditors may also resist disclosing materiality due to the risk of tipping off 
a potential fraudster when explaining the application of materiality in an audit and 
because such disclosures would inevitably be historic, thus magnifying the risk of user 
misinterpretation. These reasons were not previously contemplated in the literature and 
could lie within the 55.8% of the variability that was not explained by the GLM. 
With respect to the frequency of disclosure, auditors never disclosed materiality in the 
audit report and they rarely disclosed it to their audit clients. This confirms that earlier 
findings by Azzopardi and Baldacchino (2009) still apply in the local scenario. The non-
disclosure of materiality is reinforced at the audit firm level through formal policy or 
informal common practice. In addition, the frequency of disclosing materiality did not 
depend on whether the entity was listed or non-listed (H4 was rejected; vide Table 1)  or 
on the job position of the auditor within the firm. Furthermore, auditors’ resistance 
towards materiality disclosures did not affect how often they disclosed it to their clients 
(H3 was rejected; vide Table 1), implying that some auditors did so reluctantly. 
Objective 3: Location, Method, Content and Regulation of Materiality Disclosures 
Location refers to the type of report where materiality could be disclosed. Due to the 
resistance towards materiality disclosures, auditors were more inclined to agree with a 
report that was restricted to knowledgeable individuals who were least likely to use 
materiality for their own advantage. In fact, if materiality is to be disclosed, auditors 
recommended that for listed entities, it should be disclosed to the AC and for non-listed 
entities, it should be disclosed to their board of directors, if and only if such disclosure 
cannot be avoided. In addition, both quantitative (H5 was accepted: vide Table 1) and 
qualitative findings confirmed that auditors saw no scope for materiality disclosures for 
non-listed entities. 
By opting for the more restrictive locations, auditors disregarded Fisher’s (1990) finding 
that public materiality disclosures were more effective at improving market efficiency 
and dismissed the FASB’s recommendation “that auditor materiality thresholds be publicly 
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reported” (Davis, 2005, p.4). It seems that widening the audience of materiality 
disclosures in Malta would cause its drawbacks to increase more rapidly than its benefits 
and overwhelm them completely. 
Method refers to the way in which materiality could be disclosed in the audit report. 
Interestingly, a significant positive relationship (+0.131) between AMD Resistance and 
AMD Method Listed was discovered from the GLM (Vide Equation 1). A plausible 
explanation of this relationship would be that as auditors’ resistance towards disclosing 
materiality increased, their fear of its drawbacks also increased and in order to mitigate 
such drawbacks, they opted for more elaborate methods of disclosing it. This would have 
been reflected in a higher AMD Method Listed score. 
If materiality is to be disclosed in the audit report, according to Maltese auditors, this 
should be done via paragraphs possibly aided by tables, with no distinction between listed 
and non-listed entities (H6 was rejected; vide Table 1). Paragraphs have the advantage of 
being the most flexible method, whilst tables may complement them by adding a structure 
which could facilitate comparability. Nevertheless, auditors tended to disagree with all 
methods of disclosing materiality due to their resistance towards these disclosures. 
Contrary to Turner et al. (2010) and in disagreement with the FRC’s (2015b) praise of 
elaborate materiality diagrams in UK audit reports, footnotes, diagrams, MPS and links to 
websites should not be included. Moreover, the use of a link to a website as suggested by 
Church et al. (2008), FRC (2015b), Houghton (2010) and Vanstraelen et al. (2012) as well 
as the MPS proposed by Turner (2003) were strongly rejected. The opposition towards 
web links stemmed from the concern that they would further complicate the financial 
statements which are already difficult to read. 
Content refers to the information that materiality disclosures would actually contain. The 
overall threshold for the financial statements as a whole should definitely be included for 
both types of entities, yet it is essential that materiality is disclosed in a complete and 
comprehensive manner, which certainly would not be achieved by simply disclosing a 
number. Thus based on the findings of the study, the information outlined in Table 2 
(below) could be disclosed in order to communicate materiality information more 
effectively. These suggestions are relevant for materiality disclosures in the audit report 
and to the AC. 
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Suggested Content of Materiality 
Disclosures (for all entities)  - H7 
was rejected; vide Table 1 
Mean Rating Score Interviewee 
Count 
Listed Nonlisted 
Materiality threshold for the 
financial statements as a whole. 
3.61 3.46 5/11 
The benchmark used by the 
auditor in determining 
materiality for the financial 
statements as a whole, together 
with reasons why the 
benchmark was selected. 
3.18 2.95 4/11 
Significant qualitative 
considerations relating to the 
auditor’s evaluation of 
materiality. 
3.13 2.97 2/11 
Component materiality (for 
group audits) 
3.13 2.96 0/11 
Table 2: Suggested content of materiality disclosures 
Regulation: In agreement with the finding that auditors resist disclosing materiality, they 
also opposed making such disclosures mandatory. However, if materiality disclosures 
were to be made mandatory, then auditors believed they should be well regulated and as 
far as possible they should only be made mandatory for listed entities (H8 was accepted: 
vide Table 1). 
In comparison with limited evidence from the UK and Ireland of the success of principle-
based materiality disclosure rules (FRC, 2015b), it seems that if materiality disclosures 
are introduced in Malta, they would have to be regulated using a mixed style that has a 
certain element of rules but still allows judgement to be exercised. 
Objective 4: Present Auditors, Past Auditors and Non-Audit Accountants 
Finally, the fourth objective revealed that the opinions of auditors who were practicing 
the profession at the time the data was collected (present auditors) were significantly 
more against disclosing materiality compared with auditors who were no longer active in 
the profession (past auditors). It was also found that accountants without audit 
experience (non-audit accountants) were more in favour of materiality disclosures than 
auditors. Therefore it seems that the farther away from the actual audit work, the higher 
the support for materiality disclosures. In fact, most benefits of materiality disclosures in 
the literature emerged from studies whose samples did not include auditors. 




Overall, Maltese auditors resist materiality disclosures because their highly probable 
drawbacks greatly outweigh their potential benefits. Maltese auditors saw no scope for 
materiality disclosures for non-listed entities. In the case of listed entities, they restricted 
such disclosures to the AC. Thus the requirement of Article 11(2)(h) of EU Regulation No. 
537/2014 to disclose materiality to the AC of PIEs should not be a cause for concern. 
Materiality disclosures in the audit report should be avoided because the local market is 
not mature and knowledgeable enough to appreciate such disclosures as is currently 
being done in the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands. Moreover, if materiality is to be 
disclosed, only paragraphs, possibly aided by tables, should be considered. Materiality 
disclosures should contain the threshold for the financial statements as a whole, along 
with explanatory information (see Table 2). Regulation of such disclosures should be 
restricted to listed entities only and should be of a mixed-style which has a certain 
element of rules but still allows judgement to be exercised. 
In conclusion, materiality disclosures in Maltese statutory auditing would have far more 
drawbacks than benefits and should therefore be avoided. Positively, restricting such 
disclosures to the AC of PIEs limits their drawbacks and as a big-four audit partner 
remarked, may “lead to intelligent disclosures and intelligent discussions” between auditors 
and the AC.  
Our study focused on the views of Maltese auditors only. We recommend further research 
on this subject from the points of view of other users of audited financial statements such 
as shareholders, banks, tax authorities and creditors. Our study also focused exclusively 
on materiality disclosures and therefore it did not analyse other ways to enhance the audit 
reporting model, such as the inclusion of other disclosures in the context of an audit.  
Finally, external auditing in the public sector was also excluded from the scope of this 
study, and we believe that this is an interesting avenue for further research. 
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
This Appendix presents the questionnaire that was provided to respondents.  
Section A: Benefits and Drawbacks of Materiality Disclosures in the Audit Report 
Q1: Do you agree with the following benefits of disclosing materiality in the audit 
report? 
 
Please read each of the 
following statements 
carefully and then specify the 
extent of your 
disagreement/agreement 
with each item accordingly. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1.1: Materiality disclosures 
improve market efficiency. 
     
1.2: Materiality disclosures 
help investors perceive the 
audit report more accurately. 
     
1.3: Materiality disclosures 
align the auditor’s judgement 
of what is material with what 
really affects users of financial 
statements. 
     
1.4: Materiality disclosures 
reduce the difference between 
what users of financial 
statements think the auditor 
does and what he actually does 
(the Audit Expectations Gap). 
     
1.5: Materiality disclosures 
enhance the communicative 
value of the auditor’s report. 
     
1.6: Materiality disclosures 
provide relevant information 
for credit institutions (banks). 
     
1.7: Materiality disclosures 
reduce the auditor’s legal risk 
for post-audit misstatements 
below materiality thresholds 
disclosed. 
     
1.8: Materiality disclosures 
prevent auditors from using 
inappropriately large 
thresholds to reduce audit 
work. 
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Q2: Do you agree with the following drawbacks of disclosing materiality in the 
audit report? 
Please read each of the 
following statements 
carefully and then specify the 
extent of your 
disagreement/agreement 
with each item accordingly. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
2.1: Materiality disclosures 
reveal the extent of financial 
statement manipulation 
management can engage in 
whilst escaping detection. 
     
2.2: Users will misunderstand 
materiality disclosures, 
causing confusion and 
controversy. 
     
2.3: Users will have doubt that 
there are errors close to the 
thresholds disclosed. 
     
2.4: Users will interpret 
materiality thresholds as 
absolute assurance up to the 
level stated. 
     
2.5: Materiality disclosures 
will have a negligible effect 
and thus become unnecessary 
work and cost. 
     
2.6: Materiality disclosures 
will increase audit costs and 
pressure on the auditor. 
     
2.7: Disclosure of materiality 
thresholds pulls users’ 
materiality judgements 
towards those disclosed by 
the auditor. 
     
2.8: Litigation against the 
auditor will increase if 
materiality is disclosed. 
     
2.9: Materiality disclosures 
will result in a very long audit 
report. 
     
2.10: The wording used to 
disclose materiality 
thresholds and qualitative 
information will become 
boilerplate language. 
     




Q2: Do you agree with the following drawbacks of disclosing materiality in the audit 
report? (Continued) 
Please read each of the 
following statements carefully 
and then specify the extent of 
your disagreement/agreement 
with each item accordingly. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
2.11: Materiality disclosures 
impair the auditor’s freedom to 
exercise professional judgement. 
     
2.12: If materiality is disclosed, 
management will influence the 
auditor’s judgement of 
materiality. 
     
2.13: If materiality is disclosed, 
management will use it to justify 
misstatements or aggressive 
accounting practices as 
immaterial. 
     
2.14: Successor auditors will 
simply use the materiality 
thresholds disclosed by the 
previous auditor. 
     
2.15: Materiality disclosures for 
firms with low profitability may 
make it more difficult for them 
to obtain credit (loans) from 
banks. 
     
2.16: Disclosing materiality 
levels may cause disagreement 
with the Malta Inland Revenue 
Department. 
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Section B: Auditors’ Attitude towards Materiality Disclosures 
Q3: You would resist disclosing materiality because… 
Please read each of the 
following statements carefully 
and then specify the extent of 
your disagreement/agreement 
with each item accordingly. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
3.1: …of one or more of the 
drawbacks mentioned above (in 
Question 2). 
     
3.2: …auditors sometimes waive 
misstatements above materiality 
thresholds. 
     
3.3: …materiality information is 
sensitive or proprietary. 
     
3.4: …disclosing materiality 
thresholds gives the impression 
that materiality is not a matter 
of professional judgement. 
     
3.5: …it is difficult to anticipate 
users’ reactions to materiality 
disclosures. 
     
3.6: …audit clients do not want 
the auditor to disclose 
materiality in his report. 
     
3.7: …users would have doubts 
that there are errors close to the 
materiality levels disclosed. 
     
Other (please specify)  
 
Q4: How often do you disclose materiality to the audit client? 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Always 
4.1: If the audit client is a listed 
entity 
     
4.2: If the audit client is a non-listed 
entity 
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Section C: Location, Method, Content and Regulation of Materiality Disclosures 
Q5: In your opinion, where should materiality be disclosed, in the case of LISTED 
ENTITIES? 
Please read each of the following 
statements carefully and then 
specify the extent of your 
disagreement/agreement with 
each item accordingly. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
5.1: In the audit report (at the end of 
the audit) 
     
5.2: In the engagement letter (at the 
beginning of the audit) 
     
5.3: In an additional report to the 
Audit Committee of Public Interest 
Entities (at the end of the audit) 
     
5.4: In a report submitted by the 
auditor to the Registrar of 
Companies at the end of the audit. 
This report would be available to 
the public at a reasonable fee. 
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Q6: In your opinion, where should materiality be disclosed, in the case of NON-
LISTED ENTITIES? 
Please read each of the 
following statements carefully 
and then specify the extent of 
your disagreement/agreement 
with each item accordingly. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
6.1: In the audit report (at the 
end of the audit) 
     
6.2: In the engagement letter (at 
the beginning of the audit) 
     
6.3: In a report submitted by the 
auditor to the Registrar of 
Companies at the end of the 
audit. This report would be 
available to the public at a 
     
Other Suggestions (please 
specify)  
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Q7: How should materiality be disclosed in the audit report of LISTED ENTITIES, if 
at all? 
Please read each of the following 
statements carefully and then specify the 
extent of your disagreement/agreement 
with each item accordingly. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
7.1: Tables      
7.2: Diagrams and/or Charts      
7.3: Paragraphs      
7.4: Footnotes      
7.5: Link to a website      
7.6: By disclosing the overall Materiality 
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Q8: How should materiality be disclosed in the audit report of NON-LISTED 
ENTITIES, if at all? 
Please read each of the following 
statements carefully and then specify the 
extent of your disagreement/agreement 
with each item accordingly. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
8.1: Tables      
8.2: Diagrams and/or Charts      
8.3: Paragraphs      
8.4: Footnotes      
8.5: Link to a website      
8.6: By disclosing the overall Materiality 
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Q9: What should materiality disclosures contain, in the case of LISTED ENTITIES? 
Please read each of the following 
statements carefully and then specify 
the extent of your 




Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
9.1: Materiality threshold for the 
financial statements as a whole 
     
9.2: Materiality levels for classes of 
transactions, account balances or 
disclosures (if applicable) 
     
9.3: Performance materiality level      
9.4: Component materiality (for group 
audits) 
     
9.5: Component performance materiality 
(for group audits) 
     
9.6: Any significant revisions of 
materiality thresholds that were made as 
the audit progressed. 
     
9.7: The threshold used for reporting 
unadjusted differences to the Audit 
Committee (when applicable). 
     
9.8: Significant qualitative 
considerations relating to the auditor’s 
evaluation of materiality. 
     
9.9: The benchmark used by the auditor 
in determining materiality for the 
financial statements as a whole, together 
with reasons why the benchmark was 
selected. 
     
9.10: The percentage applied to the 
selected benchmark to determine 
materiality for the financial statements 
as a whole. 
     
Other Suggestions (please specify)  
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Q10: What should materiality disclosures contain, in the case of NON-LISTED 
ENTITIES? 
Please read each of the 
following statements carefully 
and then specify the extent of 
your disagreement/agreement 
with each item accordingly. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
10.1: Materiality threshold for 
the financial statements as a 
whole 
     
10.2: Materiality levels for 
classes of transactions, account 
balances or disclosures (if 
applicable) 
     
10.3: Performance materiality 
level 
     
10.4: Component materiality (for 
group audits) 
     
10.5: Component performance 
materiality (for group audits) 
     
10.6: Any significant revisions of 
materiality thresholds that were 
made as the audit progressed. 
     
10.7: The threshold used for 
reporting unadjusted differences 
to the Audit Committee (when 
applicable). 
     
10.8: Significant qualitative 
considerations relating to the 
auditor’s evaluation of 
materiality. 
     
10.9: The benchmark used by 
the auditor in determining 
materiality for the financial 
statements as a whole, together 
with reasons why the 
benchmark was selected. 
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10.10: The percentage applied to 
the selected benchmark to 
determine materiality for the 
financial statements as a whole. 
     
Other Suggestions (please 
specify)  
Q11: Materiality disclosures should be mandatory… 





Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
11.1: …for listed entities      
11.2: …for non-listed entities      
Section D: Other Information 
Q12: Do you agree with the following statements? 
Please read each of the following 
statements carefully and then specify the 
extent of your disagreement/agreement 
with each item accordingly. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
12.1: Users should be well educated 
before introducing materiality 
disclosures. 
     
12.2: Materiality disclosures must be 
well regulated. 
     
12.3: The term ‘tolerable error’ is easier 
for users to understand than 
‘performance materiality’. 
     
12.4: If materiality is disclosed, these 
disclosures should be intra-firm 
comparable (across time). 
     
12.5: If materiality is disclosed, these 
disclosures should be inter-firm 
comparable (across firms). 
     
12.6: Materiality disclosures would 
need to be checked by a third party 
other than the auditor. 
     
12.7: The responsibility of disclosing 
materiality should be shifted to an 
accounting or regulatory body. 
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Q13: If the Maltese audit report is expanded to include materiality disclosures, 
awards or other types of formal acknowledgement should be given to the best 
performing audit firms with respect to such disclosures. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
     
Q14: Are you aware that materiality disclosures in the audit report are mandatory 
for Public Interest Entities in the UK and Ireland? Circle the correct answer. 
Yes / No 
Q15: Are you aware that as from June 2016 auditors have to disclose materiality in 
an additional report to the Audit Committee of Public Interest Entities in Malta? (EU 
Regulation No. 537/2014) Circle the correct answer. 
Yes  / No 
Q16: If you are of the opinion that materiality should be disclosed in the audit 
report, in which section (before or after which section) should it be disclosed? 
(Optional) 
 
Section E: Demographics 
This information is required for statistical analysis. All answers are strictly confidential 
and anonymous. Please circle the correct answer. 
Q17: Gender: Male / Female  
Q18: Your age group: Tick the correct box. 
20 to 25  
26 to 30  
31 to 35  
36 to 40  
41 to 50  
51+  
 
Q19: Audit Firm Type: Big Four firm / Other 
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Manager or Assistant Manager  
Principal, Director or Partner  
Other (please specify) ________________________________  
Q21: How many years of experience in external auditing do you have? 
_________ years 
Q22: How many companies listed on the Malta Stock Exchange have you audited 
during your career (including those before obtaining your Practicing 
Certificate in Auditing, if any)? 
_______ companies 
Don’t know 
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Appendix 2: Definition of Variables 
The table below defines the statistical variables used in the study, where AMD is an 




Q3: AMD Resistance 
(dependent variable) 
Measures the auditors’ resistance to AMD. 
Q1: AMD Benefits Measure the auditors’ opinion of the benefits and drawbacks of 
AMD, respectively. Q2: AMD Drawbacks 
Q4.1: AMD Frequency 
Listed Measure the auditors’ frequency of AMD for listed entities and 
non-listed entities, respectively. Q4.2: AMD Frequency 
Nonlisted 
Q4: AMD Frequency The mean AMD Frequency for both listed and non-listed entities. 
Q5: AMD Location 
Listed 
Measure the strength of the auditors’ agreement with different 
locations of AMD, for listed entities and non-listed entities, 
respectively. 
Q6: AMD Location 
Nonlisted 
Q7: AMD Method 
Listed 
Measure the strength of the auditors’ agreement with different 
methods of disclosing materiality, for listed entities and non-listed 
entities, respectively. 
Q8: AMD Method 
Nonlisted 
Q9: AMD Content 
listed 
Measure the strength of the auditors’ agreement with different 
content of AMD, for listed entities and non-listed entities, 
respectively. 
Q10: AMD Content 
Nonlisted 
Q11.1: AMD 
Mandatory listed Measure the strength of the auditors’ agreement with mandatory 
AMD for listed entities and non-listed entities, respectively. Q11.2: AMD 
Mandatory Nonlisted 
Q11: AMD Mandatory The mean AMD Mandatory for both listed and non-listed entities. 
Q13: AMD Awards 
Measures the strength of the auditor’s agreement with AMD 
awards. 
Q14: AMD Awareness 
Foreign Measure the awareness of Maltese auditors of foreign and local 
AMD, respectively. Q15: AMD Awareness 
Local 
Demographic Variables: (Q 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22) 
Gender, Age, Audit Firm Type, Job Position, Audit Experience, Number of Listed Companies 
Audited. 
Table A2.1: Definition of Variables 
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